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during the period of trusteeship.02 As long as the debtor makes the
required payments to the trustee, he is immune from garnishment of
his wages, either in an attachment or proceeding in aid of execution,
by any creditor listed.63
It is submitted that the above recommendations, though not com-
prehensive of all improvements that could be suggested in the area of
garnishments, would go a long way toward relieving the harshness of
the remedy as it presently exists in Kentucky.
Henry R. Snyder, Jr.
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES ON COLLATERAL MATTERS
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 43.07 and 43.08 outline the
accepted procedure by which a witness's testimony may be impeached.
Rule 43.07 specifies the four methods of impeachment presently al-
lowed in Kentucky. They are: (1) introduction of contradictory evi-
dence, (2) proof of prior inconsistent statements made by the witness,
(3) proof of the witness's general reputation for untruthfulness, and
(4) a showing that the witness has previously been convicted of a
felony. We are here concerned primarily with the second of these,
contradiction by introduction of prior inconsistent statements of the
witness. Rule 43.08 requires that a foundation be laid for this type of
impeachment in order to avoid unfair surprise.' This involves merely
asking the witness if he made the out-of-court statement, identifying
it as closely as possible with regard to time, place, and persons
present. Then, if the witness denies having made the statement, con-
tradicting witnesses may be called when the cross-examiner puts on his
case. Their testimony is admissible, in this respect, only for purposes
of impeachment and the opposing party is entitled to an admonition
by the trial judge as to the limited effect the testimony is to have.
One very significant limitation upon this practice exists. A virtually
universal rule of evidence prohibits contradiction, either by prior
statements of the witness or by contradictory evidence, upon matters
which are collateral to the issues in the case. 2 It is said that upon such
62 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. sec. 2329.71 (Page 1954).
63 21 U. of Cincinnati L. R. 268 (1952).
18 Wigmore, Evidence 702 (3rd Ed. 1940).
2 Id. at 657, et. seq. 692; McCormick, Evidence 66 (1954); 58 Am. Jur. 418,
432 (1948). The rule is deemed necessary to prevent undue waste of time re-
sulting from the contradiction of any or all points in a witness's testimony. As was
said in Powers v. Leach, 26 Vt. 277 (1847):
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points the cross-examiner must "take the answer" given by the witness.
The unanimity existing in regard to the rule, however, does not extend
to the tests to be used in determining what matter is collateral and
what is not. In fact, a majority of courts take the view that no test is
to be used at all, but that collateralness can be determined only by
investigation of the circumstances of the particular case.3 Kentucky,
until very recently, consistently followed this view.4 It was rejected,
however, in a 1955 decision, Commonwealth v. Jackson.5
The Jackson case was a trial for murder. James Jackson had ad-
mittedly killed one Levi Webb, but he contended that the killing was
done in self-defense. Sallie Jackson, wife of the accused, testified
generally in support of this contention. On cross-examination, in an
attempt to lay the foundation for an impeachment by prior contra-
dictory statement, Sallie was asked the following question:
Didn't she ... ask you what the reason was for the shooting and you
said that James Jackson had shot and killed a man up there, and at
the same time you said, he had a crazy spell on then the same as he
did a few days before when he shot you? ... (Court's italics)6
Objection to the question was immediately interposed, but before a
ruling could be made, the witness answered "no". The trial judge sub-
sequently granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground
that the question, answered or not, was so prejudicial that the de-,
fendant was deprived of a fair trial. The Commonwealth appealed to
have a certification as to the propriety of the ruling, contending that
the question was a proper one with which to lay the foundation for
impeachment, and that further witnesses might be introduced to con-
tradiet Sallies denial. The Court of Appeals considered the chief
question to be whether or not the matter was collateral. A majority
held that it was not and, therefore, that contradiction was proper.
Three members of the Court dissented on the ground that the matter
was collateral and so prejudicial that no admonition could "remove its
poisonous effects from the mind of the jury."
"We may suppose, that such collateral issues might spring up in regard
to the testimony of every witness upon the stand, and thus a single issue
branch into an indefinite number of subordinate and collateral ones, and
these again into many more, upon each point, so that it would become
literally impossible ever to finish the trial of a single ease."
3 Wigmore, note 1, supra, 657.4 Stephens v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 544, 47 SW 229 (1898);
Southern Ry. v. Jones, 172 Ky. 8, 188 SW 873 (1916); Crawford v. Common-
wealth, 235 Ky. 368, 31 SW 2d 618 (1930); Miller v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
818, 45 SW 2d 461 (1932); Nolan v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 384, 87 SW 2d
946 (1935); Keene v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 308, 210 SW 2d 926 (1948).
5 281 SW 2d 891 (Ky. 1955).
6 Id. at 892.
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The question of prejudice aside, it appears that the result reached
by this decision on the issue of collateralness is correct. In the writer's
opinion, however, a curious anomaly is created by the opinion of the
Court. To begin with, the opinion works a major change in the Ken-
tucky law by introducing two tests for determining collateralness; pre-
viously the Court merely decided from the circumstances of the case
whether the matter sought to be contradicted was collateral or not.
The first of these new tests, and one to which the entire Court sub-
scribed, was laid down in the English case of Attorney General v.
Hitchcock.7 The Court there said:
[I]f the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed
on your part to prove in evidence-if it have such a connection with
the issue that you would be allowed to give it in evidence-then it is
a matter on which you may contradict him ... 8
Although some courts have held that this test limits the area of con-
tradiction to matter which a party might have introduced as part of
his case, most courts using the test have agreed with Wigmore that it
was also meant to include contradiction on matter independently ad-
missible to show bias, corruption, interest, or the like in the witness. 9
Both majority and dissenting opinions take the view that under this
test contradictory testimony showing that Sallie Jackson had made the
.statement in question would not be admissible. They agree that the
prejudicial effect of the statement would prevent it from being inde-
pendently admissible.
The majority opinion, however, adopts a further test under which
this evidence is admissible. This test, propounded by McCormick in
his work on evidence, allows contradiction of:
[A]ny part of the witness's account of the background and circum-
stances of a material transaction, which as a matter of human experi-
ence he would not have been mistaken about if his story were
true .... 10
This is further defined by the majority opinion in the principal case as
allowing contradiction by testimony which:
[Blear[s] upon the story of a witness with such force and directness
as to give it appreciable value in determining whether or not that
story is true. . . .11
or which "pull [s] out the linchpin of the story"' 2-and this applies even
7 1 Exch. 91 (1847).
8Id. at 99.
9 Wigmore, note 1, supra, 693-700.
10 McCormick, note 2, supra, 102.
11 Note 5, supra, at 894.
12 Id. at 895.
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though the matter contradicted is not independently admissible. In
applying this test to the principal case, the majority concluded that
Sallie Jackson's prior inconsistent statement, though not independently
admissible, was admissible to "pull the linchpin" out of her story of
self-defense.
Clearly, the Jackson case introduces into Kentucky law two tests
for collateralness not heretofore used. However it is the contention
of the writer that at least one, and probably both, of these tests were
unnecessary in deciding the principal case. The reason is that the
Court mistakenly directed its attention to the material to be introduced
-the prior inconsistent statement-rather than the matter already be-
fore the court. The basic rule with which we are concerned is not so
stated or intended; it does not prohibit the introduction of collateral
matter but rather introduction of contradictory matter on a collateral
point.13 Viewed from this angle, solution of the problem in the Jackson
case is relatively simple. From examination of the circumstances of
the case it is apparent that Sallie Jackson's testimony was not at all
collateral but actually relevant to the main issue-self defense. Her
earlier out-of-court statement, if true, was clearly inconsistent with
such a story. It was, therefore, fundmentally sound to allow testimony
to prove that such a contradictory statement was made, and the linch-
pin test was not necessary to reach that result.
At this point, the anomaly previously mentioned is apparent. The
case accepts two tests, the Hitchcock-Wigmore test and McCormick's
linchpin test. The Hitchcock-Wigmore test, in reality no more than
a restatement of the basic rule, was not considered sufficient to solve
the problem. Instead, it was decided by use of the linchpin test; and
this appears to be the most significant change wrought by the case.
This very change, however, created the anomaly of a case adopting a
proposition for which its bare holding cannot be considered authority.
The reason for it is this: The linchpin test is intended to operate only
when contradiction, by most tests, would be considered to be on col-
lateral matter. It is allowed if contradiction, even though on a col-
lateral point, serves to discredit the witness's entire story. In the prin-
cipal case, however, recourse to the linchpin test was unnecessary,
since, as has been shown, the contradiction was on a material point
and, hence, allowable by any test. The holding of the case, therefore,
133 Wigmore, Evidence 657: ". . . no contradiction, we are told, shall be per-
mitted on collateral matters." 58 Am. Jur. 432: "If a statement of fact collateral
to the issue is drawn from a witness upon cross-examination, the party eliciting the
testimony cannot contradict it." And even the principal case states, "It is gen-
erally recognized that a witness may not be impeached with respect to a matter
which is irrelevant and collateral to the issues in the action.
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constitutes no departure from earlier Kentucky decisions supporting
the basic rule. As a result, adoption of the linchpin test by the Court's
opinion is superfluous and confusing.
As an aid in clarification, the writer offers two suggestions. First:
The linchpin test should be rejected. This test was adopted by the
Court only when the normal avenues of admission were overlooked
and its acceptance seemed necessary to reach what was, to the majority
of the Court, obviously a just and logical result. It is doubtful that
the Court, already split on the proposition, would ever accept the test
in all its ramifications, for it is very broad in scope and elastic in
operation.
An example of the extremes to which the linchpin test can run is
found in Gulf, C. and S.F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 4 a Texas case cited
by both McCormick and the principal case. There, the plaintiff
sought to recover from the railroad for the wrongful death of her
husband whose body bad been found on the defendant's tracks. Since
there were no witnesses to the accident the question of the deceased's
condition, drunk or sober, became an important point in the de-
termination of negligence and contributory negligence. To support
her contention that deceased had been sober at the time of the accident
and thus, more likely than not, exercising due care, plaintiff introduced
Andrews, a hotel night clerk. Andrews testified that a man named
Matthews, answering deceased's description, had occupied a room in
his hotel the night of the accident, leaving at about six in the morning,
quite sober. On cross-examination, Andrews further stated that he
had told only one person, a man by the name of Wilkinson, of this
incident prior to his examination as a witness. To impeach this testi-
mony, the defense showed that Andrews thought Wilkinson to be dead,
and then introduced Wilkinson who denied that Andrews had ever
told him anything about Matthews.
The Supreme Court of Texas, like the Kentucky Court in the Jack-
son case, directed its attention to the material to be introduced. They
held that it was admissible, considering the prior silence of the witness
to be relevant in view of the extensive publicity given the case. The
opinion said:
When the existence of facts material to a plaintiff's case are put in
issue by the defense, the truth of the testimony of witnesses to those
facts is also put in issue; and evidence which has a tendency to show
the untruth of such testimony is as relevant to the issues as testimony
of other witnesses denying that the facts exist.15
14 100 Tex. 63, 93 SW 1068 (1906).
15 Id. at 1070.
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This statement, together with the holding of the case, could easily be
construed to mean that Texas will admit any contradictory evidence
which indicates that a witness is lying. It seems to say that credibility,
always in issue, may be tested on any point in the testimony of a
material witness. When attention is directed to the material here
sought to be contradicted, the inadvisability of this is apparent. Of
what consequence is it to a disposition of the case that the witness had
told his story to no one but Wilkinson. Virtually nonel To contradict
it fails to put any material point in doubt, or even to substantially im-
pair the credibility of the witness. If Kentucky means to adopt a
test as broad as this, it means to permit almost unlimited contradiction.
This could make the settlement of a particular case practically im-
possible with a never-ending trial of the witnesses overshadowing
completely the major issues.
Another case used by McCormick to exemplify his test is East Ten-
nessee, V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Daniel.' Daniel was suing the railroad
company for damages for the killing of his mule. Evidence was gen-
erally circumstantial except for the testimony of one Lofton, who
claimed to have seen the train strike the mule. Upon cross-examination
it developed that the witness was at the scene of the accident by virtue
of having gone to town to buy some tobacco at a certain store; on his
way home from making the purchase he saw the accident. The de-
fendant offered to prove by testimony of the proprietor of the store
that Lofton had not been in his store at the time stated. The Georgia
Court allowed the contradiction, saying:
While the fact which the witness proposed to prove by Copeland was
not directly material on the circumstances of the killing, it was in-
directly material because it contradicted the witness as to the train of
events which led him to be present, and thus tended to discredit him
as to the fact of his presence.'
7
Once again, contradiction is allowed on a point collateral to the issues.
It was not shown that the primary witness was not at the scene of the
accident, nor that he did not go to town at the time stated, nor even
that he did not buy tobacco, but only that he may not have bought
tobacco at the particular store named. Many possibilities still remain
to explain his presence at the scene of the accident, each of which
would have to be discounted in order to negative his story. This is
exactly the sort of thing sought to be prevented by the basic rule
against contradiction on collateral matters-a "trial" of the witnesses
which can result only in confusion of the jury and a prolongation of
the trial.
1091 Ga. 768, 18 SE 22 (1893). 3.7 Ibid.
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In a third case cited by McCormick, Stephens v. People,'8 . similar
objections apply. Stephens was on trial for the murder of his wife by
arsenic poisoning. Evidence had been introduced to show that the
accused or his brother-in-law, while they were together, purchased a
quantity of arsenic. Witnesses for the defendant, called to explain
away this purchase, testified that the poison had been used to extermi-
nate rats which infested a cellar where provisions were stored. Prose-
cution sought to contradict this testimony by showing that no pro-
visions were kept in the cellar. The contradiction was allowed, the
point being called "not strictly collateral". Here again the contradic-
tion fails to accomplish any purpose, except to show that one witness
is lying. And to what end? If there were, in fact, no provisions kept
in the cellar, certainly this alone would not prove that no rats existed
there. And so long as the possibility remains that there were rats in
the basement, the possibility also remains that it was for their ex-
termination that the arsenic was purchased. The story told by the
primary witness thus remains essentially intact, just as it did in each
of the two preceding cases. In such a situation, then, why permit the
contradiction? It accomplishes little, except to confuse the jury, be-
cause it is on a point not material to the issues in the case, a collateral
point.
Second: A new test should replace the two used in the Jackson case.'
That test is: If the matter to be contradicted is such that a timely
objection to its relevancy should have been sustained, it is collateral,
and contradiction may not be allowed. This test accomplishes two
things. In the first place, it limits the area of allowable contradiction
roughly to that encompassed by the Wigmore test. As pointed out in
the discussion of cases supporting the linchpin test, restriction of con-
tradiction to material points is necessary if the contradiction is to be
meaningful. And secondly, the proposed test directs attention to the
matter to be contradicted and away from the matter sought to be in-
troduced. This is a primary concern. The testimony to be introduced
is brought in for a limited purpose only, to impeach the witness.
Whether it is independently admissible or not is of little concern so
long as it, in fact, contradicts a portion of the witness's story which is
material to the case.
And finally, the test is stated in familiar terms. Determination of
relevancy is a common task, both for the lawyer and the judge. Using
this as a basis for a test of collateralness reduces the lawyer's job of
predicting and the judge's task of deciding. They are governed by the
familiar, certain rules pertaining to relevancy.
18 19 N.Y. 549, 572 (1859).
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Applied to the cases discussed herein, the proposed test comes to
what the writer considers a reasonable result in each case. In the
Jackson case the point to be contradicted was Sallies testimony on the
issue of self-defense. Since the principal defense of the accused was
self-defense, it could hardly be argued that this was not relevant.
Contradiction was, therefore, properly allowed.
In the other three cases, the application of the test reaches a dif-
ferent result. The statement to be contradicted in the Matthews case,
for instance, was that the witness had told his story to someone else,
prior to his testifying in court. This is hardly relevant to the funda-
mental issue of negligence, or, as pointed out, to the ever-present
issue of the witness's credibility. Having once determined this, it fol-
lows that contradiction should not have been allowed, the point being
a collateral one. Similarly, in the Daniels case the cross-examiner
sought to contradict the primary witness on a point which helped to
explain his presence at the scene of the accident. Actually, the point
was only one in a series of events leading to the witness's presence.
Objection to its relevancy would most certainly have been sustained,
since it was hardly material to the witness's testimony. It was, there-
fore, a collateral point. In the Stephens case, proof that defendant was
in possession of arsenic was highly relevant, as was the defendant's
attempt to explain this away. But it was not necessary to his story nor
relevant to this issue that provisions were kept in the basement.
Although this might have explained the presence of rats, it was actually
collateral to the main issues-those surrounding the killing.
J. Leland Brewster
